Mechanism Design & Incentives
In protocols with staking, validators, or auctions, security is game theory with real money. We model the equilibrium a rational attacker would look for, before they find it.
The risk
In systems with economic incentives (staking, validators, auctions, rewards, or market mechanisms), security goes beyond the code. We model the equilibrium a rational participant would try to exploit, before they discover it in production.
Code isn't enough
A mechanism can be perfectly written and still be vulnerable. When rewards, fees, or the order of operations allow value to be systematically extracted, the system becomes exploitable even when the code is correct.
Our approach
We work with any architecture that has economic incentives: decentralized protocols, validator networks, auction systems, or reward mechanisms. We model participants' rational behavior and design incentives that resist exploitation.
What we deliver
- Report with attack vectors ranked by profitability for a rational attacker
- Proof-of-concept economic exploits (when applicable)
- Concrete recommendations for redesigning incentives and mechanisms
- Reusable secure-design criteria for future mechanisms
Spec sheet
- Includes
- Review of incentive mechanisms (staking, rewards, fees, penalties, auctions), modeling of adversarial scenarios (collusion, value extraction, reward manipulation), risk analysis of rational behaviors harmful to the protocol, and redesign recommendations.
- Deliverable
- Report with vectors ranked by attacker profitability, proof-of-concept economic exploits, and concrete recommendations for redesigning incentives.
- Who it's for
- Teams designing or operating decentralized protocols, validator networks, staking systems, on-chain auctions, or any mechanism where economic incentives influence participant behavior.
Want to review this front with us?
A technical conversation, no sales script. We'll tell you honestly whether the risk is in your code, your incentives, or your agent, and whether we can help.